Singapore Flight SQ321

Carter Capner Law is representing many seriously injured Australian, Asian, New Zealand and U.K. passengers including those who have no physical injury but have a PTSD condition as a result of the terrifying event. Their medical evaluation is underway and it is expected that formulation of damages demands will be made to the airline’s insurers before September 2025. We are in contact with the insurer’s solicitors in order to facilitate this.

The interim report confirms that the G-forces applied to passengers’ bodies – including a drop in vertical acceleration from +1.35G to -1.5G – was sufficient to cause serious injury even to passengers restrained by a seat belt.

The final accident report from the Singaporean Transport Safety Investigation Bureau (TSIB) is expected to be released by July. It is expected that that report will confirm the event was indeed not a “freak accident” as had been originally claimed but rather that the aircraft flew through the top of a cumulonimbus thunderstorm or in close proximity to one as it passed over an area notorious for thunderstorm activity in the Irrawaddy Basin which is located in the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ).

We are also investigating the history of Singapore Airlines’ thunderstorm avoidance before and since the May 2024 accident.

Preliminary payments

The airline has begun reimbursing passengers’ treatment, accommodation and repatriation etc expenses upon production of the expense invoices. When notifying your acceptance of the payments together with your bank account details, be sure to include the following words: My/our acceptance of this sum is entirely without prejudice to my compensation rights. If you experience any difficulties in having your refunds approved, please contact our team.

Return to seat announcement; illumination of seatbelt signs

Despite suggestions from airline that a return to seat announcement had been made and the seatbelt sign illuminated prior to the incident, the evidence from those passengers we represent is to the contrary.

These things did not occur until after the turbulence event, passengers say. There were no announcements about recommending wearing seat belts while seated other than at takeoff.

Initial report

The Transport Safety Investigation Bureau (TSIB) issued a press release last week as to its initial findings. The report to which the press release relates has not been released.

The report and our own investigations reveal major safety concerns that are discussed below.

Liaising with airline’s liability insurer

We are in the course of establishing communications with the lawyers acting on behalf of the airline’s insurer to notify them of those passengers for whom we act in relation to injury compensation recovery. We will keep passengers and their families updated in that regard.

Working theory

Carter Capner’s working theory is that the aircraft flew through the top of a cumulonimbus thunderstorm or in close proximity to one as it passed over an area notorious for thunderstorm activity in the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ).

This is supported by the brief statement in the press release that the aircraft was “likely flying over an area of developing convective activity”.

Compensation consequences

Carter Capner believes – by reason of the above – Singapore Airlines will likely be unable to prove the accident occurred without any element of fault on its part.

This opens up the second tier of Montreal Convention compensation to seriously injured passengers whose cost of future care and treatment; and their future loss of earning capacity cost exceeds USD$175,000.

Unanswered questions

To put passengers’ minds at rest, the airline can and should answer many of the below questions now.

1. Who were the operating aircrew at the time and if not the captain, what was the experience level of the first officers at the controls?
2. What is the distance mandated in the airline’s operations manual for pilots to stay clear of thunderstorms?
3. What were the pilots doing at the time of the onset of the incident and in particular how carefully were they monitoring the weather radar to ensure accurate radar returns?
4. Why didn’t the crew divert from track to avoid proximity to thunderstorms?
5. When precisely in the sequence of events was the autopilot disengaged by the crew and what were the control inputs by the crew after that occurred?